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A brief history of (residential child care) ethics 
 
SMITH, M (2010) ‘A brief history of (residential child care) ethics’ Scottish Journal of 
Residential Child Care 9 (2) pp. 2-10 
 
An earlier version of this paper was delivered to the Child Care History Network 
conference in Cheltenham, November 2009. 
 
Introduction 
When I started working in residential care in 1981 I considered my job to be a vocation. 
By the time I left, 19 years later, ideas of vocation had become suspect, as had personal 
relationships.  Instead, a host of what Stephen Webb calls ‘technologies of care’, ideas of 
‘evidence-based-practice’ or ‘best practice’, had reduced the relational and holistic nature 
of care to a series of administrative tasks. This brave new world was said to represent 
progress, modernisation, professionalism and a host of other hurrah terms. I couldn’t help 
but think we had lost a lot along the way.  
 
During my time as course director of the MSc in Advanced Residential Child Care, I 
discovered Moss and Petrie’s (2002) book, ‘From children’s services to children’s 
spaces’. It began to make sense of the unease I felt about the direction residential child 
care had taken or been taken in. It was something of an epiphany; we were playing on the 
wrong ballpark altogether. Moss and Petrie argue that residential child care is 
 2 
fundamentally, irredeemably, a moral endeavour, yet it has, over time been reframed as a 
technical-rational one.  
 
Getting students to buy this notion of residential child care as, primarily, a moral task 
wasn’t always easy. I remember, in the course of my early attempts to introduce such 
ideas, being told by a seasoned campaigner that I was going too far this time. He had a 
point; rethinking residential child care as a moral endeavour can be almost counter 
intuitive, challenging an Enlightenment inheritance (of which more later), which leads us 
to seek rational and prescriptive solutions to human problems. Reframing these problems 
as moral ones requires that we put a stutter into dominant narratives that would have us 
believe that warmly persuasive ideas of ‘improvement’ and ‘modernisation’ can be 
achieved through ever-more prescriptive practice standards, codes of conduct, and their 
attendant regulatory apparatus. It also requires that we put aside the conceit and the false 
certainty promised, but incapable of being delivered, by such technical-rational fixes. 
Paradoxically, it begins to implicate the quest for such fixes in many of the problems 
encountered in residential child care. This position is increasingly recognised in the social 
work literature, where there has been a discernible turn to ethics as a counterweight to 
technical and managerial ways of working ( e.g Meagher and Parton, 2004, Webb 2006) 
and indeed in the literature on residential child care (Smith, 2009). 
 
So what are ethics? 
The term ‘ethics’ can be used in different ways, often interchangeably with moral 
philosophy. Basically it is the study of the norms and standards of behaviour people 
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follow concerning what is good or bad, right or wrong. There are three main branches of 
ethics: meta-ethics, which concerns the big questions of where our ideas of good and bad, 
right and wrong might come from; normative ethics, which attempt to offer principles 
that might guide our moral conduct in particular situations and applied ethics, which 
examine specific issues. Examples of such issues in residential care might include 
personal touch or physical restraint.  
 
Starting at the beginning 
This article sketches some ethical ideas and frameworks as they relate to residential child 
care over time. In attempting such a historical sweep I am nothing if not ambitious, 
starting at a meta-ethical level with Adam and Eve, or at least with their offspring, Cain 
and Abel. When God said to Cain, ‘Where is your brother?’ Cain replied ‘I know not. 
Am I my brother’s keeper?’ In this retort Cain, according to the sociologist Zygmunt 
Bauman, introduced the seeds of immorality into the human condition. Of course Cain is 
his brother’s keeper; it is part and parcel of what makes him (and us) human. Being 
human is an orientation to ‘the other’. ‘I am a moral person because I recognise my 
brother’s dependence and accept the responsibility that follows (Bauman, 2000: 1). These 
two words, dependence and responsibility are central to moral comportment. Ironically, 
ideas of dependence and the infinite responsibility that follows from it have come to be 
avoided in much professional social work. To be professional nowadays can seem to be 
about promoting independence and not becoming emotionally involved. 
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Beginning any exploration of how ethical ideas relate to care with a Bible story is 
perhaps fitting. Until very recently the human call to care was essentially a religious one, 
epitomized perhaps in the Christian tradition in the story of the Good Samaritan who 
crossed to the other side of the road to reach out to a stranger in need. Do you love me…? 
The Bible asks … ‘Feed my lambs … Take care of my sheep’. Again, this is a tradition 
that can appear alien within the public if not always the private sphere of contemporary 
social work, although there may be some signs of a shift in this regard. Keith White 
(2008), for instance, resurrects ideas of ‘love’ and God’ in recent writing on residential 
care. 
 
Of course the call to care isn’t unproblematic; it can be abused, through either design or 
neglect. A persistent tension emerges between the desire to support a selfless reaching out 
to the other and the perceived need to guard against the excesses or abuses that 
engagement with the other can open the way for. In some respects what side we come 
down on in this debate may reflect our own more fundamental experiences and 
understandings of human nature and human relationships. All relationships exist 
somewhere along a continuum of love and fear (Smith, 2008). The dominant impulse in 
recent decades has been one of fear, reflected in a tendency to deal with increasing 
fragmentation and uncertainty in society by imputing the worst in human relationships. 
Thus, we witness the proliferation of regulation, predicated upon an atavistic belief that 
this is required to prevent social care workers abusing those they work with (McLaughlin, 
2008). 
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The Enlightenment 
This tension between the innate badness or goodness of human nature is not new. 
Thomas Hobbes, an early Enlightenment thinker, identifies human nature as instinctively 
base and selfish and requiring some external power to keep it in check. But there were 
other strands of Enlightenment thought, much of it emanating from Scotland. 
 
The Enlightenment was a period of intense scientific and philosophical activity that swept 
across Europe over the course of the 17
th
 and 18
th
 Centuries. It marks the beginning of the 
‘modern’ period in human history. Scottish Enlightenment thinkers reflected what was 
essentially an optimistic view of human nature. Francis Hutcheson, Professor of Moral 
Philosophy at the University of Glasgow, identified in human nature what he considered 
to be almost a sixth sense, that of benevolence. Adam Smith, better known perhaps for 
his contribution to economics was also a moral philosopher and he identified an innate 
sympathy in the human condition, while David Hume observed a human predilection 
towards doing good, noting that virtue brings with it a sense of pleasure and vice a 
feeling of pain. Our feelings, therefore, provide a natural guide for moral conduct. The 
Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, however, came out on the losing side in moral thinking 
in the eighteenth century (Tronto, 1994).  
 
Two ‘winning’ ethical approaches emerged from the Enlightenment, both normative in 
the sense that they sought to set overarching principles to guide moral behaviour. One of 
these was utilitarianism, associated with the English radicals Jeremy Bentham and John 
Stuart Mill. Utilitarianism decreed that the touchstone for moral decision-making ought 
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to be a calculation of the greatest good. It is oriented towards the consequences of actions 
rather than the actions themselves. 
 
The other winner in Enlightenment ethical thinking was the Prussian philosopher 
Immanuel Kant. Kant, famously, claimed that Hume awakened him from his dogmatic 
slumbers. Our understanding of ethics would have been very different had Hume left 
Kant to sleep. 
 
Kant believed that, rather than being driven to act in a moral way by virtue of some 
innate sense of benevolence or sympathy, human beings used reason to determine how 
they ought to behave. They were considered to be rational, autonomous individuals. Kant 
also formulated his categorical imperative, which decreed that what was considered right 
in one situation should apply more universally. There is little room for context in Kant’s 
ethics.  
 
Within a Kantian frame of reference ideas of care are reduced to a sense of duty (Kant’s 
ethics are deontological or duty based). If one accepts a role as a carer this carries with it 
certain duties. Workers are to act upon those duties rather than upon any more 
emotionally grounded call to care. The notion of care as a duty perhaps reaches its apogee 
in the Regulation of Care (Scotland) Act (2001). This sets out where care is to be 
provided, by whom and the penalties for failing to provide it. Nowhere, however, does it 
get close to defining what might be meant by care. 
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Following Kant, rationality became the touchstone of human conduct despite Hume’s 
prescient observation that reason could only be the slave of the passions. Social work 
ethics have largely developed around Kantian principles, stressing universality, 
objectivity, reason, legalism and proceduralism (Clark, 2000). As Sewpaul observes: 
 
Given its birth during the period of modernity with its emphasis on reductionist, 
logical positivist rationality, .... social work took on this dominant discourse in the 
pursuit of status and professionalism. To this end we have seen codified systems of 
ethics, the move towards greater standardisation and competencies development, 
...systems of accreditation,... and an increase in the development and use of 
professional jargon (2005:211). 
 
The professionalisation of residential child care 
The professionalisation of social work following the 1968 Social Work (Scotland) Act 
and the declaration that followed, claiming residential care to be a branch of social work, 
reinforced a particular view of what it was to be ‘professional’. Social workers were not 
to be ‘diverted by their personal beliefs and convictions or by emotions - sympathy or 
antipathy - to fellow workers or to individual clients ....’ . Actions ‘should not be oriented 
to persons at all, but to the rules … (Bauman, 1994: 5).  
 
The nature of care itself shifted from what was essentially a private and largely domestic 
task to become more public and ostensibly professional. This saw a shift away from the  
‘aunties’ and uncles’ and live-in staff who had been at the heart of models of family 
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based care to what Douglas and Payne (1981) term an industrial model. In this the 
personal and professional selves of carers became separated, on the one hand by 
structural changes such as the introduction of shift systems, but also by discourses that 
made particular assumptions of what it was to be ‘professional’.  Thus, ensuring that 
children had clean socks and brushed their teeth regularly was not considered to be 
‘professional’ but counselling them around particular difficulties was. The focus of care 
shifted from the ‘soul’ of erstwhile religiously based care to the ‘psyche’ of a more 
secularized version. And dealing with the ‘psyche’ called for the imposition of a 
‘professional’ distance between the carer and the cared for. Erstwhile notions of care 
became suspect; social work discourses of independence, empowerment and anti-
institutionalisation became totems of a profession that could consider itself ‘so tainted by 
its associations with care that the word should be expunged from its lexicon and its 
rationale’ (Meagher and Parton, 2004: 4).  
 
Interestingly, contemporary commentators observed that ‘neither staff nor residents have 
really benefited from the introduction of industrial practices and conditions to human 
service organisations’ and that‘ staff, through no fault of their own, have given up trying 
(Douglas and Payne, 1981). I will return to what I consider to be an explanation for why 
staff might give up trying but before doing so I will address some of the issues raised by 
what have become the dominant ideologies that have come to frame residential care 
within social work, specifically those of rights and protection. We are encouraged to 
believe that such concepts are self-evidently ‘good things’ and that they need to be 
enforced through codification. Yet the very notions of children’s rights, child protection 
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and a faith in codes of practice to enforce these betray a rationalist conceit and, moreover, 
reflect an essentially misanthropic view of human nature. 
 
Rights, protection and codes 
Children’s rights, as they have emerged in public policy, derive from an essentially 
Kantian view of human nature, ‘premised on particular values and a particular 
understanding of the subject as a rational, autonomous individual’ (Dahlberg and Moss, 
2005: 30). By this way of thinking we become linked to one another through a series of 
contractual relationships rather than anything deeper. Specifically, there is little sense of 
community and inter-dependence within rights discourse, yet, paradoxically, true 
freedom only emerges from what the French philosopher Emanuel Levinas terms 
heteronomy, a sense of community and responsibility for the other. 
 
Protection, similarly, betrays a particular take on human relationships. It ‘involves a very 
different conception of the relationship between an individual or group, and others than 
does care. Caring seems to involve taking the concerns and needs of the other as the basis 
for action. Protection presumes … bad intentions …. (Tronto 1994: 104). Assumptions 
that derive from ubiquitous child protection discourses have been instrumental in the 
creation of climates of fear and suspicion within child care settings and have seriously 
limited carers’ capacity to care. 
 
These dominant discourses of rights and protection have become reified in various codes 
and standards. The regulation of care legislation is premised upon a reductionist 
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assumption of a need to ‘protect’ service users, rather than anything more aspirational. 
This goal of protection is to be achieved through codes and standards. However, these too 
are 
‘negative rather than positive, products of fear rather than a characteristic of a 
confident profession or workforce’. Codes give no space for context or good 
professional sense, and so were generally ‘ignored or became unworkable’, 
creating ‘guilt at their non-compliance’ (Piper, 2006). 
 
The self-serving nature of regulation based around contestable discourses of rights and 
protection reflects the spirit of our age, that age being one that no longer believes in 
modernity’s promise of steady progress and that spirit being one of fear, concerned to 
avoid things going wrong rather than with articulating any more hopeful vision of the 
future. This fear is evident in hyper-proceduralism. It is almost as if we recognise that 
procedures are not working, but rather than draw the conclusion that they might in fact be 
part of the problem, the ‘rational’ mindset seeks to address this problem through recourse 
to ever-more ‘technical’ solutions. The results of this are all too apparent to practitioners 
forced to spend more and more time writing about children rather than being with them, 
exhorted by regulators to believe that if something hasn’t been written down it hasn’t 
happened. Such a mindset is highlighted in the following quote from a magazine feature 
comparing children’s homes in England and Germany. 
 
Staff are expected to keep three simultaneous daily logs. The first is a handwritten 
diary noting movements of staff and children in and out o the home; no Tipp-Ex 
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corrections are allowed and all unused parts of pages must be crossed through and 
initialled. The second is a round-the-clock record of the children’s activities and 
staff registering, for instance, if a child gets up for a glass of water in the night. The 
third is an individual log compiled each day for each child, noting their activities 
and behaviour. All these logs and diaries must be stored for a minimum of 75 years - 
partly in case a child makes an allegation of abuse against a care worker. So many 
need to be held onto that thousands are kept at a disused salt mine in Kent. (Sunday 
Times 18
th
 March, 2007). 
 
This scenario is, paradoxically, a product of ostensibly ‘rational’ minds. It perhaps raises 
questions as to whether it is just documents that ought to be consigned to salt-mines in 
Kent or even further afield. It also takes us to the nub of the matter in terms of 
considering an appropriate ethical understanding of care. Care, according Levinas, has to 
be exercised face to face without intermediaries. When so many procedural 
intermediaries circumscribe care, its very essence is compromised. Bauman argues that 
‘.... when we obscure the essential human and moral aspects of care behind ever more 
rules and regulations we make the daily practice of social work ever more distant from its 
original ethical impulse’ (Bauman, 2000 p.9). ). By this reckoning the plethora of rules 
and regulations that increasingly surround practice are not just minor but necessary 
irritants; they act to dull the moral impulse to care. This, perhaps, goes some way to 
explaining why workers give up trying. 
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Alternative ethical frameworks 
The difficulties inherent in overly proceduralised approaches to practice calls for an 
exploration of alternative ethical frameworks within which to consider care. The wider 
‘turn’ in ethics is away from a reliance on the normative ethics provided by Kantian and 
utilitarian approaches. There is a growing interest in care ethics and a resurgent interest in 
virtue ethics both of which may point a way forward in offering more appropriate ways 
of thinking about care. 
 
Care ethics  
Carol Gilligan was a research student of Lawrence Kohlberg who developed what has 
become a standard theory of moral development. According to Kohlberg, women rarely 
achieved his highest stage of moral development. Gilligan (1982) reinterpreted his data to 
argue that, rather than being less moral than men, women applied different ways of 
thinking to moral decision making; they spoke in a different moral voice, one that 
emphasised qualities of care, compassion, context and intuition. Men, by contrast, 
inclined towards decision-making based around qualities of justice, objectivity and 
reason. From Gilligan’s initial work a whole literature has built up around what has 
become known as care (or feminist) ethics. 
 
An ethic of care, according to Joan Tronto, one of its most influential proponents, is ‘a 
practice, rather than a set of rules or principles…It involves both particular acts of caring 
and a ‘general habit of mind’ to care that should inform all aspects of a practitioner’s 
 13 
moral life’ (Tronto 1994, pp126/7). It is both an activity and a disposition. Care ethics 
eschew Kant’s universalism being bound to concrete situations, rather than being formal 
and abstract. (Sevenhuijsen 1998). They demand a way of caring that challenges the 
expectation that carers are dispassionate and objective, taking ’... professional caring into 
the personal realm and requir(ing) that both parties show up, be present, be engaged at a 
feeling level for each other. The presence of feeling(s) provides the link which connects 
the worker and client. Very simply put, without this connection, without the feeling(s) in 
the relationship, the people do not matter to each other (Ricks, 1992). Henry Maier 
(1979) makes a similar point arguing that physical care needs to be transformed to caring 
care. By means of example, workers might think of the act of getting children up in the 
morning. Anyone can wake a child and tell them to get out of bed but to perform this act 
in a caring way might involve the worker knowing the particular likes and preferences 
and rhythms of an individual child and responding to these. This can only happen when 
the ‘self’ of the carer becomes central to the experience of care. Care becomes enacted 
and meaningful in relational rather than instrumental terms. Care ethics are increasingly 
identified as an ethical paradigm that can challenge procedural ways of thinking and 
acting (Meagher and Parton, 2004). 
 
Virtue ethics 
Another approach that challenges dominant normative ethics is that of virtue ethics, 
Associated with the ancient Greek philosopher, Aristotle, virtue ethics are oriented 
towards human flourishing and a conception of ‘the good life’. They locate morality 
within the personal characteristics of the moral actor rather than in the duties imposed by 
 14 
abstract rules. And, of course, there are those people each of us might identify as 
exemplifying virtues of care and who we might be happy to have care for us. Children in 
care, too, can pick out those who truly care for them. David, a respondent in Cree and 
Davis’ book exemplifies this point, noting ‘There were people who really cared and that 
shone through; and there were people who didn’t care and that also shone through’ (2007: 
87). And then, ‘There was a nun, who was the head nun of our children’s home who was 
very, very fair, and kind, but not in a ‘goody-goody’ way – she was a just person, and she 
offered us protection’ (2007:87). Good care, from a virtue ethics perspective, is 
dispositional; it cannot be separated from the ‘self’ of the carer. 
 
Conclusions 
So what tentative conclusions might we draw from this consideration of ethical 
approaches as they relate to care. Firstly, approaching care from an ethical rather than a 
technical-rational standpoint throws up some fundamental disjunctions between the way 
that care is currently conceptualized and managed and any sustainable understanding of 
what care actually involves. An obvious disjunction is that public care is provided, 
directly or indirectly, by organizations that profess rationality. Yet, care is not rational. 
According to Bauman, ‘There is nothing reasonable about taking responsibility, about 
caring and being moral (Bauman 2000: 11). Caring involves ‘being for’ the other and 
assuming the personal responsibility that follows from this. This may require carers to go 
against convention, to cross to the other side of the road to reach out to someone that the 
procedures manual might identify as dangerous or ‘a risk’. Care cannot be reduced to the 
rational prescriptivism imposed by the procedures manual or the risk assessment.  
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The wider point here may be that normative ethical theories are inadequate in providing a 
guide to practice that is rarely clear-cut but is, by its nature, messy and ambiguous 
(Bauman, 1993). In that sense merely following the rules is insufficient. As Ricks and 
Bellefeuille note:  
 
Codified rules of what to do in particular cases and cases of like kind, gets us off 
the hook of moral endeavour…Adherence to codified rules does not necessarily 
require self-awareness or accountability for taking a moral stance. It simply 
requires learning the rules and following them… 
(2003:121) 
Merely following the rules in complex areas of practice can be dangerous and oppressive. 
Policy makers, managers and indeed care workers would do well to relinquish the quest 
for some elusive ‘best practice’ and to become comfortable with uncertainty; care 
requires reflexive and morally active practitioners rather than unquestioning followers of 
rules. This, of course, demands a radical turnaround, away from relationships based 
around fear to those based around love. Again, Bauman offers some philosophical 
rationale for this arguing, perhaps following the lead of the Scottish Enlightenment 
philosophers, that there is an innate goodness in humankind. We are not good because of 
societal rules and impositions; rather society exists because individuals are capable of and 
carry out good and caring acts on a daily basis. 
 
 16 
In many respects care needs to move away from normative ethical frameworks, with their 
false promise of some elusive ‘best practice’ and to consider meta-ethical frameworks 
and applied ethical debate. Meta-ethics, to recap, addresses the big picture such as what 
might a ‘good life’ look like, what are our hopes for our children and what kind of 
relationships do we want with them? Applied ethical debates might take us toward how 
we might help children move towards this notion of the good life in our caring 
interactions. What constitutes good care needs to be worked out in concrete situations 
amongst the cared for and those caring. Care that is divorced from the caring relationship 
can, according to Noddings, ‘become self-righteous and politically correct. It can 
encourage dependence on abstraction and schemes that are consistent at the theoretical 
level but unworkable in practice’ (2002 p.22/23). Workers in residential care will 
recognise this tendency. This makes it all the more important that those who know 
residential care need to be at the heart of ethical debates around what it should be like. 
And those debates need to have at their heart a notion of care that centres around the 
personal relationship between the cared for and the one caring, with all the complexity 
and duplicity that this entails. We need to provide care settings that allow such 
relationships to emerge and to flourish. 
 
A starting point in these debates might be to consider a different vocabulary to help us 
frame what it is we do and what it is that we hope. Perhaps it is time to put aside 
simplistic and individualised conceptions of rights, to put aside protection, risk, risk 
assessment, ‘best practice’, codes, standards and to consider a vocabulary that speaks a 
different language with regard to children. Moss and Petrie offer some possibilities: 
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Joy, spontaneity, complexity, desires, richness, wonder, curiosity, care, vibrant, play, 
fulfilling, thinking for yourself, love, hospitality, welcome, alterity, emotion, ethics, 
relationships, responsibility — … are part of a vocabulary which speaks about a 
different idea of public provision for children, one which addresses questions of the 
good life.’ (2002, p.79). 
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